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Cases and evidence

Iran and beyond: when states refuse permission

Iran in 2026

  1. January 2026

    Nationwide shutdown

    Security forces killed protesters in their thousands under cover of a nationwide Internet shutdown.
  2. 28 February

    Renewed blackout

    After a brief partial restoration, a renewed near-total blackout as war broke out.
  3. Late May

    Partial restoration

    After 88 days of the renewed blackout alone, the longest nationwide shutdown in the country’s history (TechRadar). Access remains filtered and tiered.
  4. October 2026

    The fight goes abroad

    Iran's Foreign Ministry summoned Norway's ambassador to demand that Starlink stop operating in Iran.

Iran is the coalition’s first case because it shows most clearly what is at stake. In January 2026, security forces killed protesters in their thousands under cover of a nationwide Internet shutdown. With the network cut, hospitals could not coordinate, families could not find the missing, and the outside world could not see what was happening.

This was by design. The UN fact-finding mission on Iran found that the authorities cut the Internet as they escalated the killings, and that the decision “served to conceal this shift and the increasingly violent repression that followed” (UN fact-finding mission). In September 2026 the mission concluded that what happened amounted to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/63/61).

The death toll is still contested, and the shutdown is part of the reason. The Iranian government acknowledged 3,117 deaths. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) documented 7,007 confirmed deaths in the first 50 days, with 11,744 more cases under review, as of February 2026 (HRANA). Confirming a name requires corroboration, and corroboration requires communication.

The shutdown did not end with the protests. After a brief partial restoration, the authorities imposed a renewed near-total blackout when war broke out on 28 February. Before connectivity was partly restored in late May, Iranians had lived through the longest nationwide shutdown in the country’s history: 88 days of the renewed blackout alone (TechRadar) (CPJ). Access remains filtered and tiered.

Throughout, smuggled satellite terminals carried out much of the evidence the world saw, including images of hundreds of bodies at the Kahrizak morgue south of Tehran (EBU). But terminals were scarce outside wealthier areas. Smaller provincial cities received “little, if any, media coverage” (Center for Human Rights in Iran), and from places such as Izeh and the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, almost nothing got out (Euronews). By February, smuggled terminals were selling for around $4,000 on the black market (Bloomberg).

Owning a terminal is now a criminal offence, and use judged to be “for the benefit of hostile states” can carry the death penalty (IranWire). Police say they have seized nearly a thousand terminals and arrested more than 160 people (Iran International).

Iran has also taken the fight abroad. On 5 October 2026 its Foreign Ministry summoned Norway’s ambassador to demand that Starlink stop operating in Iran, because Starlink’s filings at the ITU go through Norway’s regulator (Mehr News). Each complaint builds Iran’s case for WRC-27.

Not only Iran

In Sudan, satellite terminals have kept banking, aid and family contact going through a civil war, although the service was never licensed there. In 2024, after the government complained that it had no licence, the operator told users it would cut service. Nearly 100 humanitarian groups warned that this would collectively punish millions (Arab News). Armed groups use the terminals too (TIMEP). But as one Sudanese activist told the writer Yassmin Abdel-Magied, “Decrying the choices people are making on the ground is the privilege of people who have options” (New Lines).

Cases like these will shape how WRC-27 treats unauthorised satellite access. Our position is the same in each: keep every protection against harmful interference, but give no state, and no company, the power to cut off a whole population.

None of today’s technology could have prevented what happened in January. The rules and commitments being set now will decide whether the next generation can reach people the next time.